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THE NUSSEIBEH–AYALON PLAN:
Common Ground or Quicksand?
Peter Lippman
The establishment of the state of Israel fifty-six years ago and the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 deprived the Palestinians of
their self-determination. The resulting ongoing struggle for the return of
Palestinian refugees and for a homeland has been manifested in continuous
violence and insecurity for both sides. Over the past few decades,
numerous “peace processes” have been launched and failed.
With the advent of the new Intifada in the fall of 2000, and the
subsequent arrival of hardliner Ariel Sharon as prime minister, Israel and
Palestine have descended into the fiercest cycle of violence yet seen
between the two adversaries. The Oslo peace process, ostensibly the most
promising attempt since the beginning of the occupation, is dead. In its
place several other schemes intended to bring the ongoing strife to an end
have surfaced. One of these is the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan,1 named after the
Palestinian and Israeli figures who crafted it.
The Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan is bold and simple, expressed in one page of
text that proposes, through significant compromises for both sides, to put
the conflict to rest forever. One of the plan’s strengths is that it foresees the
resolution to sticky “final status” questions whose lack of resolution
doomed the Oslo process. The plan also proposes to go directly “to the
people” for support, instead of being conducted entirely at an elite level.
These two elements of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon approach could, if pursued
sincerely, ensure a greater chance of success than that enjoyed by any
previous peace process.
However, the Nusseibeh–Ayalon proposal has fatal defects that will
prevent its acceptance by a great majorityof Palestinians whose fate it
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purports to resolve. Furthermore, the plan has been stillborn into an
environment where far stronger forces have ensured that it is quickly
marginalized.

I. PROBLEMS WITH NUSSEIBEH–AYALON
At first glance, several elements of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon proposal
immediately stand out as problematic. The most troublesome include:
1. Recognition of Palestine as the only state of the Palestinian people and
Israel as the only state of the Jewish people.
This establishment of two ethnocracies goes against the several
generations long trend of recognition that modern states cannot award
citizenship rights to inhabitants solely on the basis of their ethnicity and
expect to thrive in peace. It also legalizes before the world, in
contravention of all international human rights law, the discrimination
against Palestinians—one fifth the Israeli population—now in practice in
Israel.
2. Permanent borders between the two states will be agreed upon on the
basis of the June 4, 1967 lines.
For a two-state solution to be successful, it will certainly have to involve
Israel’s return to its 1967 borders. Gaza is currently inhabited by
approximately 7,000 Israeli settlers (alongside over one million
Palestinians) who control over 20 percent of its land. The West Bank,
including Palestinian East Jerusalem, contains over 150 Israeli settlements
dotted throughout the countryside. A good faith withdrawal would send all
the settlers who are not willing to become Palestinian citizens back to pre1967 Israel. However, the third item of the proposal, covering the issue of
Jerusalem, states:
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3. Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian
sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty.
It happens that vast sections of East Jerusalem, formerly 100 percent
Palestinian and illegally annexed by Israel soon after the 1967 takeover,
have been made into Israeli settlements. These massive settlements,
constantly stretching the geographic definition of Jerusalem, have grown to
extend all the way to Bethlehem in the south, Ramallah in the north, and
well into the West Bank to the east. Thus granting Israeli sovereignty to
these settlements automatically means the annexation to Israel of large parts
of the West Bank. Not only does this annexation truncate the future
Palestinian state and severely disrupt Palestinian thoroughfare, it is also
unrealistic to believe that any land of equal value on the current border
between the West Bank and Israel could be found that would compensate
for the loss of this territory.
4. Palestinian refugees will return only to the State of Palestine; Jews will
return only to the State of Israel.
For the Palestinians, this point is so objectionable that it cannot be taken
seriously. During the war that led to the establishment of the state of Israel
in 1948, Israeli forces expelled over 800,000 Palestinians from their land,
and destroyed at least 400 villages. Over 300,000 Palestinians were further
displaced during the 1967 war. Today, these refugees and their descendents
exceed four million, living in camps in the Occupied Territories, all the
countries surrounding Israel, and in many other countries throughout the
world. They have not given up their dream of returning to their ancestral
homeland.
These are the most problematic points of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan,
though not the only ones. Altogether, the plan’s implementation requires
the Palestinians to swallow their long-held hopes for repatriation without
promising them a viable homeland in an intact West Bank and Gaza. More
likely, implementation of this plan would see a crowded, impoverished, and
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under-developed Palestine subservient to its rich and powerful Israeli
neighbor.
Clearly, there are conflicting claims upon the land of “historic Palestine.”
Israeli and Palestinian national myths and dreams clash, and it cannot be
denied that both sides must make compromises. In the eventual resolution
of this conflict, strident calls for absolute justice will have to be left behind.
But the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan, a reflection of the long-term power
imbalance between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, does not afford the
Palestinians a measure of justice sufficient to reassure them that they can
look forward to self-determination and a healthy livelihood.

II. CONSULT THE REFUGEES
The Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan involves a process whereby masses of
Israelis and Palestinians are encouraged to sign a petition in its support,
which will thus translate into pressure on the Israeli government in favor of
the plan’s implementation. According to the plan’s drafters, by early Spring
2004 activists had indeed collected over 300,000 signatures, around 40
percent of them Palestinian.2 Promoters of the plan characterize this work
as a way of consulting the grassroots of both peoples for support.
However, at the same time the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan has met with a
heated, angry response on the part of many Palestinians who resent its facile
way of trading off their right to return. This right is enshrined in the UN’s
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution
1943 (whose implementation was intended to be a condition of Israel’s entry
into the United Nations), and other significant international legal
documents. The Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan constitutes an abrogation of these
documents for all time.
In the Fall of 2002, soon after the Nusseibeh–Ayalon proposal was first
publicized, eighty Palestinian grassroots and refugee organizations in the
Occupied Territories and surrounding countries released a statement
condemning the proposal. The statement reaffirmed the commitment of
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Palestinians to their right to return and criticized the proposal for granting
Israel impunity for its expulsion of the Palestinian population. An official
launching of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan in Ramallah was cancelled due to
protests.
The question of support for return is in fact a thorny one. Given the time
that has elapsed since the expulsions, some Palestinians have resettled
comfortably—especially in Jordan, where they have acquired citizenship—
and will not be interested in uprooting themselves to return. Others—
especially in the impoverished camps of Lebanon, where discrimination has
been the rule—will be quick to come back. But regardless of circumstance,
Palestinians have not renounced their rights en masse. Whether or not
individuals are prepared to return, they still wish for their rights to be
recognized. This is a basic requirement for the fulfillment of justice needed
for Palestinians, from their side, to lay the conflict to rest.
At present, assertions that “no Palestinians have relinquished the right of
return,” countered by assertions that “only an insignificant number of
Palestinians would move to Israel” constitute a fruitless rhetorical polemic,
fueled more by passionate insistence than by fact. It seems obvious that an
open process of direct consultation with the mass of Palestinian refugees
would go a long way towards shoring up one position or the other, and
would as such be a helpful step in identifying a resolution to the conflict.
Some work has been done in this direction, notably by Khalil Shikaki,
director of the Palestinian center for Policy and Survey Research in
Ramallah. In 2003, Shikaki released findings from a survey of 4,500
refugees living in the Occupied Territories, Jordan, and Lebanon.4 While
over 95 percent insisted on Israel’s recognition of the right to return,
Shikaki reported that over half of the respondents said that they would
accept compensation or homes in a Palestinian state, and only around ten
percent stated that they would return to present-day Israel.
The Palestine Liberation Organization’s Refugee Affairs Department
contested these results, and a group of angry Palestinians attacked Shikaki’s
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office and damaged it when he tried to make a public statement concerning
his findings. Shikaki’s evaluation of these events was that Palestinians
interpreted his findings as a rejection of the right to return, even though he
publicized his respondents’ clear desire for the recognition of that right.
It is apparent that with regard to the question of refugee return, the basic
principle of consultation has not been fulfilled. Thus, it seems clear that a
wide-ranging survey to clarify the refugees’ wishes is in order. This
investigation should be led by the refugees themselves. If the results lean
towards return, the project should transform itself into a grassroots
movement. Only in this way will the voice of the refugees be heard. That
the millions of refugees are fragmented and under-represented is
understandable, but only they can take matters into their own hands and
change this situation.

III. NUSSEIBEH–AYALON PLAN FLESHED OUT:
THE GENEVA ACCORDS
If the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan is the skeleton, the forty-six page Geneva
Accord5 is the flesh. This unofficial initiative, hammered out by Israeli
opposition figures together with officials from the Palestinian Authority
(PA), gives life to the ideas presented by Nusseibeh and Ayalon. Nusseibeh
and Ayalon assert that their plan is different from the Geneva Accords, and
potentially more rooted in the will of the people, by virtue of their petition
campaign, as well as the fact that they have left the details of their plan to
be determined by greater participation.
However, the Geneva Accord, released in the fall of 2003, has so much in
common with the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan that it should be taken as a
faithful representation of the intent of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon project’s
goals. It is important to examine the Geneva Accord not only for this
reason, but also because the Accord has captured the imagination of
politicians and moderate opponents of the occupation worldwide. In effect,
it has piggy-backed on the momentum of the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan.
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Significant elements of the Geneva Accord include: restrictions against
the return of Palestinian refugees to their pre-1948 homes;6 de-militarization
of the new state of Palestine without a corresponding de-militarization of
Israel;7 annexation of Israeli settlements8 (especially the large settlements
around Jerusalem) with the unlikely promise of an equal land swap;9 and an
ongoing Israeli and international military presence in Palestine.10
Like the Nusseibeh–Ayalon proposal, the Geneva Accord undercuts the
entire body of international law supporting the Palestinians’ right to refugee
return and, in spite of its detail, makes no provision for an Israeli
acknowledgment of its own responsibility in the decades-long suffering of
the Palestinian people. On the contrary, it frees Israel from this burden
materially by leaving the number of Palestinian refugees allowed into Israel
up to the discretion of the Israeli government.11

IV. “OSLO WARS”
If one takes a closer look at developments in Israel and Palestine since
the first Intifada, a common theme of intensification of the occupation
becomes visible. While moderate opponents of the occupation fervently
believed that the 1993 Oslo agreement signaled peace between the two
peoples and the end to the occupation, that “peace process” was in fact the
front end of a continuum that finds its culmination in the initiatives of
Nusseibeh–Ayalon and Geneva.
The commonality between these three projects is their lack of concrete
improvement for the Palestinians, which translates into the lack of a
promise of peace for all parties. Oslo promised much, but the thorniest
problems have never been addressed. After 1993, checkpoints and
roadblocks proliferated throughout the Occupied Territories at a drastic rate,
closures and other draconian restrictions on Palestinian rights skyrocketed,
and illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank doubled their population
within ten years.
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Not only did the Israeli authorities (both Likud and Labor) demonstrate
their long-term goals of unofficial annexation and their disregard for
Palestinian self-determination quite clearly during the Oslo period, but the
nature of the Palestinian Authority as a collaborationist organ also became
obvious to those whom it governed. This may come as news to those who
have been persuaded that Yasser Arafat is the “head of all terrorists,” (as the
current rhetoric of the Sharon government holds), but in fact Arafat and his
colleagues, after they repatriated from Tunisia in 1993, formed a regime
that did little more than subcontract the occupation on behalf of the Israelis.
Euphoria reigned when Israeli troops left the centers of most Palestinian
cities, but it did not take long for the Palestinians to realize that Israeli rule
had been replaced by a very corrupt government that served, in many ways,
as a proxy occupation.
The Palestinian Authority has shown itself to be the embodiment of the
impulse among a few Palestinians to make vast compromises with the
Israelis, going against the interests of its own constituents. These people
agreed to the Oslo agreement even though it left all international borders
with Palestine under the control of the Israeli government, gave Israel veto
power over all decisions taken by the Palestinian government, and placed
the better part of the West Bank (“area C”) under the complete control of
the Israeli occupying force.
The agreement also required the Palestinian Authority to police and
repress its own subjects as they began to feel the increasing constriction
from an occupation that had not withdrawn, but only redeployed. To do so,
the PA established a bewildering number of secret security forces, and
Palestinians began to be incarcerated——even tortured, at times——in the
same jails in which they had previously been mistreated by the Israeli
authorities. Needless to say, this proxy Palestinian enforcement of the
Israeli government’s desires did not endear the PA to the Palestinian
population, and one of the only things that has to a small extent repaired
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Yasser Arafat’s esteem in the eyes of his subjects is the fact that the Israelis
have incarcerated him in his Ramallah compound for several years.
Sari Nusseibeh is president of Al Quds University in Jerusalem, and
former Palestinian Authority political commissioner for East Jerusalem.
Yasser Abed Rabbo, head of the Palestinian group that negotiated the
Geneva Accords, is Arafat’s Minister of Information. Thus both of these
initiatives, from the Palestinian side, have been crafted by figures whose
political stance can be interpreted as directly representative of the
“cooperative” position of the PA.
During a recent visit to Israel and the Occupied Territories, I had
occasion to listen to the presentation of a hard-line Israeli settler living in
one of the small enclaves of Hebron. I was startled when he referred to the
current Intifada as the “Oslo War.” His implication was that giving
Palestinians hope for statehood gave them the audacity to rebel against the
“rightful (Israeli) owners of the land.” Upon reflection, I would have to
accept the term, if not its racist implication. The present Intifada is a
rebellion against the deal made between the Palestinian elite and the Israeli
government, and the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan and the Geneva Accords are
two new, if only theoretical, incarnations of that arrangement.
When proponents of these schemes speak of “painful concessions for
peace” on the part of the Palestinians, they are ingenuously acknowledging
the fact that the Palestinians simply do not have the negotiating leverage to
win justice for their cause. At least, that is what the Palestinian elite
believes, and its representatives seem to be satisfied with selling off
Palestinian rights in return for a few villas and other ostentatious, but
limited, emblems of power. However, the Palestinian grassroots antioccupation movement has another kind of power, and it will continue to
defy the occupation, and the manipulations of its own illegitimate leaders,
persistently.
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V. EUPHORIA?
There has been a strong contrast between the response to the Nusseibeh–
Ayalon plan and the Geneva Accords in the Occupied Territories and in the
West. Other than the above-described reaction, the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan
did not make much of a splash in Palestine. When the Geneva Accords
were announced in the fall of 2003, they were met with vituperation by the
mainstream Israeli press, which denounced Yossi Beilin (one of the chief
Israeli drafters) as a “traitor.” Meanwhile, around the West Bank my
inquiries as to the value of the initiative were met, more or less, with a
“huh?” response. It was clear that Palestinians at home in the West Bank
are much more preoccupied with issues such as the oncoming “Separation
Wall,” which is steadily advancing through the olive groves of the West
Bank and the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem.
As this Wall progresses, it increasingly separates Palestinian farmers
from their cropland, urban families from their relatives, students from their
schools, and merchants from their shops. When the Wall is finished, the
mass of Palestinians will be fenced off into ghettoes. This specter, far more
than the advent of yet another unpromising peace deal, is what is on the
minds of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
Meanwhile, the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan and especially the Geneva
Accords have been hailed as a breakthrough by moderate opponents of the
occupation in the West. Governments and mildly liberal peace activists
alike have taken up the banner of Geneva as a “brave and encouraging
solution” and as “proof that there is a negotiating partner” among the
Palestinians. Given the stark contrast between this hopefulness and the
reality of the intensifying occupation, this euphoric response is reminiscent
of a messianic movement, quite in denial of the facts.
Community organizations promoting the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan and the
Geneva Accords in the West tend to be top-heavy with supporters of Israel
whose impulse for peace stems much more strongly from the desire for a
“secure Israel” (with as few Palestinian citizens as possible) that retains the
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vast (heretofore) illegal Israeli settlements, than from any great concern
about equal justice for all.

VI. SIDESHOW
In the end, the Nusseibeh–Ayalon plan and the Geneva Accords have no
prospects because their parent, the Oslo peace process, is long since dead.
The militaristic option of corralling the Palestinians now reigns, and the
softer approach of cooperation with a Palestinian collaborator regime has
been discontinued. However, the advent of the annexationist Wall also
closes off the possibility of a two-state solution, and cements the
accomplishment of the current single state that exists between the
Mediterranean and the Jordan River.
If it is not already so, soon the two-state option will be yet another peace
fantasy. Commentators and activists are increasingly turning their attention
to the prospect of a single democratic state that allows both Palestinians and
Israeli Jews to live in freedom, democracy, and tolerance. At present this
too is but a fantasy, but all political realities, pleasant or atrocious, start this
way. It is for the residents of the land to decide, eventually, how they can
live together in a decent way. A prerequisite for this future will be
compromise. But justice will also be a necessary ingredient.
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